This December marks the 20th Anniversary of the Soviet
Invasion; yet, many questions regarding
the reasons for the 1979 invasion are still being debated.
Whatever the reasons for the invasion, what remains clear
is that 1999 also marks the 10th Anniversary of the
Red Army's withdrawal from Afghanistan. Many have
addressed this issue, but unfortunately due to emotional ties,
views have become very untenable and highly biased. Moreover,
individual viewpoints do not change the facts. The fact is
that during the past two decades, thousands of Afghans
have been buried in distant graveyards, while their homeland
literally has become a graveyard.
This article briefly reexamines Afghan-Soviet relations
since Afghanistan's independence until it was suppressed by the
Red Army soldiers. Following the summary will be a closer look
at the chronology of Afghan-Soviet relations. Both sections
contain historical importance. Hopefully, this presentation
will be beneficial for those researching Afghan-Soviet relations.
It may also help in the research of more sound conclusions for
what lies ahead for Afghanistan.
The history of Afghan-Soviet relations reveals a pattern
of persistent
Russian expansionism. Soviet
interests in Afghanistan can be traced back to the 19th
century. Czarist Russia had strong diplomatic ties with Kabul
and had promised Afghanistan military support against the
British. In fact, when the British started the second Afghan-Anglo
War in 1878 and advanced on Kabul,
Amir Sher Ali appealed to the Russian
commander from Mazar-i-Sharif. The Russians were unable to send troops
across Afghanistan's mountainous backbone, the Hindu Kush, to Kabul in the
winter. (Adamec, 1991; Meyer, 1999).
After the October Revolution, the Soviet Union tried to exercise
significant influence in Afghanistan, which has lasted up until
today. The Soviets were the first to declare their all-round
support for the 1919 National Independence of Afghanistan under
Shah Amanullah. Moreover, the Soviet Union has been the first
country to recognize every new government in Afghanistan,
with the exception of the current regime in Kabul.
Vladimir Lenin wrote a letter to Shah Amanullah urging that
Afghanistan take great historic task of uniting around itself
all enslaved Muslims and leading them on the road to freedom and
independence. Although few Afghans have met with Lenin, the
first encounter was an informal one. In the 1980's, a photograph
at the Afghan Foreign Ministry revealed the image of the first
Afghan to have ever met Lenin. The photograph, taken somewhere
in Russia before a crowd listening to Lenin. Abdul Majid Zabuli
lived in Russia at that time and was the young spectator in the
crowd. After the Soviet Revolution, Zabuli established himself
in Moscow as a trader when the Soviet New Economic Policy granted
valued foreigners certain privileges in commerce.
In spite of the friendly rhetoric, differences existed between
the two leaderships: Shah Amanullah opened diplomatic relations
with the emirate of Bukhara in order to afford them legal
recognition as sovereign states from Soviet control. He hoped
to incorporate the Islamic people beyond the Amu Darya into
an Islamic Confederation. This hope soon became unrealistic
after the fall of the emirate regime in Bukhara. In December,
1925, a serious crisis in Afghan-Soviet relations threatened
Afghanistan's national sovereignty. Soviet troops occupied
the island of Darqad (also called Urta Tagai and Yangi Qala)
on the Amu Darya which Afghanistan considered Afghan territory.
After the Bolshevik Revolution, refugees from the Soviet Union
settled on the island, including some freedom fighters called
Basmachis. They used the island as a base for attacks on the
Soviet Union. Since the USSR wanted to maintain good relations
with Shah Amanullah's government, the Red Army soldiers evacuated
the island and stopped raiding the Basmachis base.
Shah Amanullah visited President Kalinin in Moscow
en route to Afghanistan from Europe.
When Shah Amanullah relinquished the throne in 1929, the Soviet
Union maintained its embassy in Kabul. In 1929, when
General Muhammad Nadir returned to regain the throne
for Shah Amanullah, the USSR immediately recognized the new
administration even though later General Muhammad Nadir was
proclaimed king by his comrade-in-arms. The new king sent his
half-brother Muhammad Aziz (father of Sardar Mohammad
Daud and Sardar Mohammad Naim) as ambassador to Moscow to indicate
the importance of the post. His government also made some
overtures to the Soviet Union by levying pressure on the Basmachi
refugees whom Shah Amanullah had initially supported.
In 1931, under the command of Shah Mahmud, the Basmachi movement
in northern Afghanistan was expelled and forced into Soviet
territory where they were arrested and summarily executed.
Furthermore, Nadir Shah re-negotiated the Afghan-Soviet
Treaty of Friendship and signed a commercial treaty. As a
result, from 1929 to 1933, trade increased substantially
between the USSR and Afghanistan.
After the 1933 assassination of Nadir Shah, his son Mohammed
Zahir took what Eastern and Western aid he could get,
milking both sides and attempting not to become too dependent
on either side. However, this formula soon failed and
Afghanistan became aligned with the Soviets. The Soviets
developed the country's infrastructure and trained young
Afghans with an eye to strategic advantage. Moreover, as
a result of the Pakistani trade blockade, the Afghans had
to rely more and more on Soviet goodwill for their trade.
In 1953, when
Sardar Muhammad Daud
became Prime Minister for the monarchy, Soviet interventionism
was bolstered in Afghanistan because of the Pashtunistan dispute;
the dispute concerned the Afghans tribes trapped by the nominal
Durand Line in the British created state of Pakistan. The tribes
wanted to be given self-determination rights to choose their fate.
As a result, the 1955 The Afghan National Grand Assembly (Loya
Jirga) showed their supported by stating that the trapped tribes
should be able to choose if they wanted an independent
Pashtunistan, dependence on Pakistan, or to be incorporated
with their motherland Afghanistan.
The Loya Jirga viewed the U.S. support for its rival's Pakistani
military forces as a hostile maneuver and accepted Soviet arms.
This strengthening of Pakistan was viewed in Afghanistan as a
weakening of Afghanistan's power, which in turn reduced the
possibility that Pakistan would come to terms with Afghanistan
over border disputes. Afghanistan's willingness to accept large
scale Soviet aid caused concern in the United States, however,
the U.S. had limited direct interest because Afghanistan was not
a significant trading partner, a transit route, source of oil or
other minerals, nor was the U.S. obliged to Afghanistan because of
any treaties. Also, early on from the Franklin Roosevelt
administration until the Nixon presidency, Afghanistan's requests
for arms were rejected. As a result, Loya Jirga
decided to accept Soviet arms.
However, Afghans politicians such as Abdul Malik Rahimzai wanted to
contain the presence of the USSR and US in Afghanistan. Rahimzai
and others favored taking one-for-one, meaning never take more
equivalent worth rubbles than dollars, vice versa. Therefore before
accepting Soviet aid, Prime Minister Sardar Daud made one final
unsuccessful appeal for military assistance from the United States.
However, due to the numerous U.S. rejections for political support
and military aid requests by the Afghan government, Afghanistan
turned out of necessity to the Soviets for assistance.
In December 1955, when
Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin came to Kabul,
the Soviets supported Afghanistan in the Pashtunistan dispute.
In addition, the Soviets offered massive aid to the monarchy in
Afghanistan, which the United States was unwilling to match. The
Afghan government
turned to the Soviet Union for the weapons it could not obtain from
the West.
In 1957, Soviet military mission arrived in Kabul. In 1960, aside
from other Soviet diplomats in Kabul, the Soviet military mission
had swelled in number to 500 people. In 1955, an Afghan-Soviet
Transit Agreement was signed between Kabul and Moscow allowing
Afghanistan to move its trade with third party countries through
Soviet territory.
In 1959, as Afghan-Soviet relations proliferated and the Afghan
government
encouraged the removal of the veil,
traditional leaders protested in Kandahar and were arrested.
Between 1954-64, the Soviet Union assisted the Afghans to the tune
of 527 million dollars, twice the amount as the United States.
For example, in 1964,
A. Kosygin and Soviet delegation arrived in Kabul to discuss expansion of Afghan-Soviet
Economic Cooperation. During this time, Afghanistan signed more
than 15 agreements with the USSR. As a result, Afghanistan became
dependent on Moscow for foreign trade, petroleum, and arms. With
the arms and weapons arrived Soviet advisors and experts and
what followed were thousands of Afghans going to the Soviet
Union for military training. Graduates from Afghan institutes of
higher education won fellowships to foreign universities,
including the USSR, and there emerged a growing cadre of military
officers, students, and technocrats with modern democratic
sympathies.
From 1957 until 1974, the Soviets trained more than 60,000 skilled
Afghan workers and 5,200 technicians. By the early 1970s, about
90% of the Afghan armed forces were being trained by the Soviets.
In addition, about 1.5 billion dollars of Soviet military assistance
was promised to Afghanistan.
In July 17, 1973, a coup staged by these segments of society
declared Mohammed Daud as the country's first President and the
Soviets immediately recognized the first new republican government.
Two years later, the Soviets gave Afghanistan 437 million dollars
in economic credit. Then in 1976, an Afghan-Soviet Trade Agreement
was signed that called for a 65 percent increase in commerce by 1980.
As a result, the new government continued a strong pro-Soviet
orientation. In April 1977,
President Mohammed Daud and NV Podgorny (Chairman of Soviet Presidium) met in Moscow.
During President Daud's last year, his authoritarian rule
alienated many people. In fact, within one week in 1978, the
entire country underwent a change starting with the mysterious
assassination of political ideologue
Mir Akbar Khyber.
"15,000 people turned out on the Kabul streets to march behind the
casket in a disciplined crowd made up largely of what passes for
a young middle class in Afghanistan" (The Economist, 1978). After
the mass demonstration at Khyber's funeral, major political figures
were imprisoned because of fears created in President Daud's
Cabinet.
The consequences were: first, the lack of a public statement in
regards to his close friend's assassination cast doubt to his
loyalty to his followers; second, imprisoning other allies confirmed
the belief that President Daud must be part of the assassination
plot and wanting to eliminate all political rivals. It was believed
that the administration planned to execute these political figures.
President Daud's sympathizers felt betrayed by him and participated
in the coup against the Republic. The Shah of Iran tells a similar
story, "My advisors built a wall between myself and my people.
I didn't realize what was happening. When I woke up, I had lost
my people."
As a result, within 24 hours of the incarceration, the only
political figure not imprisoned, Hafizullah Amin, led the
orchestration of the coup. The next morning, a new government
with Nur Muhammad Taraki at the helms, was declared.
Although the new government considered itself non-aligned, it was
very much in alliance with the Soviet Union. According to Dobbs
(Nov 23-29, 1992), the April Revolution of 1978 caught the Kremlin
by surprise and Moscow had even warned against the obstacles.
Taraki instituted drastic social and economic measures, including
land reform, women's rights and education, thus continuing to
offend those with vested interests in maintaining the status quo.
The U.S. recognized the regime within a week and continued to send
economic aid.
However, after the expulsion of their political rivals from the
government,
Prime Minister Amin launched a
campaign of terror having opponents arrested and shot. As a
result, the regime was losing ground; hence, in December 1978,
Taraki and Brezhnev signed the Afghan-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship in Moscow. So, when
Taraki returned from Moscow he planned to eliminate Amin. By
ousting Amin, the regime hoped to end the terror and slow down
the controversial reforms. As a result, they would broaden the
regime's base.
When Taraki's secret plan to remove Amin leaked out, Amin seized
power and executed Taraki upon his return from Moscow. Amin took
the leadership (link to 15.mov) for himself because all of
his political rivals were either dead, in jail, or exiled in
European and regional countries. The Amin regime executed
and imprisoned intellectuals and technocrats from all over
the political spectrum, even his own party members such as Taraki.
How to stop the Pol Pot-style state-terrorist regime of Amin was on
everyone's mind. Evidently, it was on the Soviet Politburo's agenda
as well. Whatever the reasons were, Moscow legally explained their
actions by referring to the December 5, 1978 Treaty which President
Taraki renewed. Furthermore, they also legitimized their actions by
citing Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which refers to
the right of nations to individual and collective self-defense
against external aggression. The 20-year military, economic,
and mutual security treaty with Afghanistan further legitimized
their actions. The Soviets described Amin as an imperial agent
repudiated by his own government when he tried to initiate a purge
of the politicians, army personnel, and intelligentsia. Amin found
himself confronted by a widespread revolt by the entire country.
Although the final decision to invade might have been formulated
within only a week, the Soviet invasion was the outcome of a
systematic process spanning many decades. Afghan-Soviet relations
evolved through different stages: commercial, technological,
cultural, political and finally direct military integration.
Strong economic and military ties between Afghanistan and the
Soviet Union had developed in such a way that they created a
dependency relationship with obvious political implications,
and complete dependence on the Soviet Union. Increasing dependence
of Afghanistan on its largest trading partner, Soviet Union, in
the different stages of integration ultimately laid a
logistical infrastructure for invasion.
From this overview, it is obvious that at every stage of Soviet
integration, Afghanistan's involuntary dependence was becoming
more irreversible. As a result, the direct intervention of the Red
Army soldiers in Afghanistan was the culmination of all prior
stages. According to Adamec (1991), "the fact that the experiment
with democracy in the 1960s ended in failure, war, and foreign
intervention should not be surprising."
Unfortunately, hindsight is never available until an event
transpires, or the prevailing circumstances of the 1940's-1970's
were not different. One is reminded of the famous saying, "The road
to hell is paved with good intentions."
It is understandable that no administration would have ever
predicted that their collective contributions to Afghan-Soviet
relations would bring such a day when Afghanistan would become so
integrated with the Soviet Union. Similarly, no current politician
would have ever envisioned that their collective role during the
last seven years would have brought Afghanistan to the lowest
point in the history of civilization.
